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CONFLICT IN CONFLICTSVESTED RIGHTS VERSUS PROPER LAW:
AN ENGLISH DON READS BABCOCK
P. R. H. WEBBt
FACING the New York Court of Appeals in
PROBLEM
THE
Babcock
v. Jackson1 is not of a kind that has yet come before
an English court for solution. Accordingly the case has much in it
to interest English conflict lawyers.
The facts are simple. On September 16, 1960, Miss Georgia
Babcock and her friends Mr. and Mrs. Jackson, all of whom were
residents of Rochester, New York, left Rochester in Mr. Jackson's
automobile, with a view to taking a week-end trip to Canada. Miss
Babcock was a guest in the car. Some time after the party reached
Ontario, Mr. Jackson evidently lost control of the automobile; it left
the road, hitting a stone wall, and Miss Babcock was badly injured.
On her return to New York, she instituted a negligence suit against
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Jackson subsequently died, and his executrix was
substituted as defendant in his place.' At the time of the accident
there was in force in Ontario a statutory provision that "the owner or
driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business
of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or
damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person
being carried in . . .the motor vehicle." 3 There is no such rule as
this in New York, whose legislature has repeatedly refused to enact a
t M.A., LL.B., University of Cambridge; Reader in Conflict of Laws, University
of Nottingham, England.
1. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
2. Cf. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 41,

§ 1 (3).
3. Highway Traffic Act

§ 105

(2) ; ONT. PUv. STAT. ch. 172 (1960).

(193)
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statute on these lines. A traditionalist approach would, needless to
say, demand that the Court of Appeals deny recovery-the decedent's
conduct may have been tortious, but there was this special element,
namely, the guest statute operating in the lex loci, which prevented a
cause of action against the decedent from ever coming into existence
in the plaintiff's favour.4 The majority of the court5 boldly threw
tradition to the winds and, in so doing, freely admitted that Homer,
even in the august shape of Holmes, J., has nodded. 6 They held
that the state which had the more dominant contacts and the superior
claim for application of its law as to whether the plaintiff was, as guest,
barred from recovery was the state of New York, for it was there
that the parties resided, there that the guest-host relationship arose,
and there that the car trip was to begin and to end. Ontario could
thus be relegated to limbo as being merely the fortuitous locus of the
accident (and thus having but a minimal contact with the factual
consideration) ; there was "no conceivable interest in denying a remedy
to a New York guest against his New York host for injuries suffered
in Ontario by reason of conduct which was tortious by Ontario law." 7
Recovery was accordingly allowed.
The application of a "grouping of contacts" theory, as in Auten
7'. Auten, s will not strike English conflict lawyers as new-fangled.
4. See, e.g., LEILAR, CONFLICTr OF LAWS 209 (1959) ; EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF

577 (1962), and cases cited therein.
5. Fuld, J.,delivered the judgment, and Desmond, C.J., and Dye, Burke and
Foster, JJ., concurred with him. Van Voorhis, J.,delivered a dissenting judgment
with which Scileppi, J., concurred.
6. This has been accomplished by the court's refusal to accept the doctrine of
vested rights as espoused by Holmes in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120,
24 S.Ct. 581 (1904), accepting instead RXSTATSM tNT (SgcoND), CONFLICT or LAWS
§ 379, comment d and e (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
7. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482-83, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1963).
8. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). This was an action to recover installments allegedly due under a separate maintenance agreement executed in New York
in 1933. Plaintiff and defendant were married in England in 1917 and lived there
until 1931 when defendant allegedly deserted his family and went to Mexico where lie
obtained a divorce and then proceeded to marry another woman.
The plaintiff came to New York seeking some mode of settlement, and the
outcome was the separate maintenance agreement of 1933. The agreement also
provided that neither party should sue in any action relating to their separation and
that the wife should not cause any complaint to be lodged against her husband. The
wife then returned to England. The defendant did not live up to the agreement
so that in 1934 the plaintiff filed a petition for separation in an English court. Alimony
pendente lite was ordered, but the case never came to trial.
In 1947 the defendant, having realized nothing from the English action and little
by reason of the New York action, sued on the 1933 New York separation agreement
for back payments. The defendant claimed that the 1934 English suit was a repudiation
of the 1933 agreement and demanded dismissal by way of summary judgment which
was granted. The lower court's decision was based on New York law which evidently
held that the 1934 action did indeed amount to a repudiation of the 1933 agreement.
The New York Court of Appeals held, however, that English law should have
been applied owing to the fact that that was the country with all the signifiLAWS
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They have become accustomed to this approach ever since Lord
Simonds, in a Privy Council case, Bonython v. Commonwealth of
Australia,9 declared that the proper law of a contract was "the system
of law by reference to which the contract was made or that with
which the transaction has the closest and most real connexion." This
test has been accepted by the House of Lords itself and was applied
by it in In re United Rys. & Regla Warehouses Ltd., ° as an English
conflict rule. McNair, J., utilised it also in Rossano v. Manufacturer's
Life Ins. Co." in order to ascertain the proper law of three endowment policies of insurance. It is, however, regrettably the case that
no English court has yet overtly applied this doctrine in the sphere of
tort. That this is the case is due to that rigid adherence to the doctrine
of stare decisis which prevents English courts from departing from
the much and justly maligned rule in Phillips v. Eyre. 2 This states
that an act done in a foreign country is a tort and actionable as such
in England only if it is both (i) an act which would be a tort had it
been done in England, and (ii) "not justifiable" according to the law
of the foreign country where it was done. The highly unfortunate
double-barreled nature of this rule and the refinements that have been
made of it have incurred almost universal opprobrium' 3 and, taken
together, they elicit nothing but envy of the good sense displayed not
only by the court in the present decision, but also by the results
achieved in cases such as Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc."4 and
cant contacts. Thus, the case was remanded to determine and apply the proper
English Law.
Accord, W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945);
Comment, Conflict of Laws: "Party Autonomy" in Contracts, 57 COLum. L. Rtv. 553
(1957) ; Comment, Conflict of Laws and the Discharge of Contracts: An Approach,
57 CoLuM. L. Rzv. 700 (1957).
9. [1951] A.C. 201, 219 (P.C. 1950) (Austl.).
10. [1961] A.C. 1007 (1960).
11. [1962] 3 Weekly L.R. 157 (Q.B.).
12. [1870] 6 Q.B. 1, 28-29, per Willes, J. The rule as a whole has been accepted
in the House of Lords. See Carr v. Fracis Times & Co., [1902] A.C. 176, 182 (1901),
per Lord Macnaghten. Lord Lindley, at 184, clearly accepted part (ii) of it. It was
generally accepted by the Court of Appeals recently in In re United Rys. & Regla
Warehouses, Ltd., [1960] ch. 52, 98 (C.A.), per Jenkins, L.J. No reference to this
point was made by the House of Lords on appeal.

13. See

CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

286 nn.3-9 (6th ed. 1961).

14. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). The salient facts
in this case were as follows: plaintiff's intestate boarded a plane in New York
destined for Massachusetts. The plane crashed in Massachusetts causing the death
of the intestate. There was in effect at the time of the disaster a provision of the
General Statutes of Massachusetts which gave a cause of action against a common
carrier for negligently causing a passenger's death, but limited to not less than $2,000
or more than $15,000 the damages to be awarded therefore.
The New York Court of Appeals held that while the New York Court could
enforce the Massachusetts cause of action, it did not have to consider the damage
limitations. This was a purely procedural matter. Thus, plaintiff was allowed his
full measure of damages.
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Grant v. McAuliffe.1" Similarly, nothing but sympathy can be evoked
16
by the strictures of Judge Frank in Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
It is naturally tempting to an English lawyer to hazard a guess
as to how an English court might have solved the present case
inutatis mutandis-that is, assuming the accident still to have occurred
in Ontario, but that Mr. and Mrs. Jackson and their guest, Miss
Babcock, had all been residents of, for example, Rochester in the
English county of Kent, and had gone to Canada for a holiday from
there. Like New York, England has no guest statute. Applying the
English choice of law rule, it would be clear that the first "arm" of
it would be satisfied. The deceased's conduct was admittedly negligent,
so that there could be no doubt that, had the accident occurred in
England, it would have rendered the driver liable in tort. It is the
second "arm" of the rule that would give rise to difficulty. Assistance
might be derived from a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in MlcLean v. Pettigrew.' There, the plaintiff had been travelling as
guest in the defendant's car and had been injured in Ontario owing
to the defendant's careless driving. Both parties were residents of,
and domiciled in Quebec, where the plaintiff subsequently sued the
defendant. The statute law of Ontario, which was the lex loci as in
the case under review, then contained a provision indistinguishable
from the present law."8 By the law of Quebec, the lex fori, a driver
could be made civilly liable towards his guest by means of an action
in quasi-delict under the Civil Code of Quebec, Article 1053. The
defendant had in fact been prosecuted in Ontario under section 27 of
the Ontario Highway Traffic Act for driving without due care and
15. 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). In this case plaintiffs, residents of California, were injured in an accident in Arizona when their car collided with that of the
defendant's decedent. Under the law of Arizona the cause of action did not survive
the death of the defendant's decedent, but under California law it did. Thus, the
plaintiffs sued in California. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to abate.
The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that whether or not a cause of
action survived was a question of procedure and was thus to be determined by the
law of the forum.
16. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956). Here, plaintiff, a citizen of the United States,
was injured by defendant's servant while temporarily in Saudi Arabia. Defendant was
licensed to do business in New York, and plaintiff therefore selected that forum
for suit. The plaintiff did not alleged or prove the law of Saudi Arabia; thus, the
federal district court dismissed on the ground that the law of New York (this was a
diversity case) required a pleading of the foreign law. Judge Frank said during the
course of the opinion:
Both the parties are Americans. The plaintiff was but a transient in Saudi
Arabia when the accident occurred and has not been there since that time. The
defendant company engages in extensive business operations there, and is therefore in a far better position to obtain information concerning the law of that
country. But, under the New York decisions which we must follow, plaintiff
had the burden. As he did not discharge it, a majority of the court holds that the
judge correctly gave judgment for the defendant. Id. at 545.
17. [1945] Can. Sup. Ct. 62, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65 (1944).
18. Highway Traffic Act, § 47(2), R.S.O. c. 288 (1937).
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attention, but the local magistrate had acquitted him. The Supreme
Court took the view that the plaintiff could succeed: both "arms" of
the choice of law rule were regarded as having been satisfied. As
regards the second "arm," the Court held that the defendant's conduct
was "not justifiable" notwithstanding the Ontario statutory provision
denying a right of action to a guest. Following another much maligned
English decision, Machado v. Fontes,19 but without any attempt to
analyse it at all, it was considered that the second "arm" of the
Phillips rule was still satisfied if it could be shown that the Ontario
magistrate had been wrong in acquitting the defendant of careless
driving.2" The trial judge, the Quebec Court of Appeal and the
Canadian Supreme Court appear to have shared the view that the
defendant had not driven with due care and attention and were thus
2agreed that his conduct had been criminal according to the lex loci.
It is beyond peradventure that this result is defensible upon either a
"grouping of contacts" theory or a "proper law of the tort ' 22 basis.
But it has to be remembered that the court applied neither of these
tests. The rule in Phillips as extended by Machado, which is what
the court did apply, lays itself open to severe criticism-especially,
indeed, to the charge that it distinctly encourages "forum-shopping."
On the other hand, there must be mentioned a decision of the
Quebec courts, Lieff v. Palmer.2 3 There the plaintiff, domiciled and
resident in Ontario, had been injured in Ontario whilst riding as
guest in the automobile of the defendant, who was also domiciled
and resident in Ontario. Again, the Ontario law deprived the plaintiff
of her right of recovery. Nothing daunted, however, she sued in
Quebec, arguing that the defendant had driven carelessly and thus
criminally within the meaning of the criminal law of Ontario. This
ought, according to Machado, to have enabled the plaintiff to succeed.
That she did not is due to two factors: (a) Rivard and Letourneau,
J.J., realised that the plaintiff was invoking Machado simply in order
to "forum-shop" and therefore declined to follow it, and (b) Galipeault,
Walsh, Barclay and Rivard, JJ., decided that there was no proof that
19. [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.). It was there held that if A published a statement
in Brazil which libelled B, B could successfully sue A for libel in England even
assuming that libel was only a crime according to Brazilian law and gave rise to no
action in tort at all.
20. The civil courts are not bound by an acquittal on a charge of careless driving.
La Fonciere v. Perras, [1943] Can. Sup. Ct. 165, [1943] 2 D.L.R. 129 (1943).
21. DIcEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 937-39 (7th ed. 1958), reproduced in WEBB &
BROWN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 294-95 (1960) ; cf. the strictures of EHRENZWEIG, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 548, 580-81; Morris, Torts in the Conflict of Laws, 12 MODERN L. REv.
248 (1949) ; Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1950).
22. CHXSHIRE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 286-87.
23. [1937] 63 Qu6. B.R. 278. See especially at 285, per Rivard, J.; cf. Williams v.
Tang & Mitchell, [1933] 2 West Weekly R. 113.
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the defendant's lack of care was such as to render him criminally
liable under Ontario law. This result conforms not only to that which
would be achieved by applying a "grouping of contacts" theory or a
"proper law" doctrine, but also to what a strict application of the rule
in Phillips would demand if untrammelled by Machado. Assuming,
then, that Mr. Jackson's driving had been criminal in the eyes of
Ontario law, an English court prepared to follow the Canadian Supreme
Court would find for Miss Babcock. Were the driving not criminal,
she would fail. If, however, the English court were prepared to prefer
the Quebec approach, it would deny recovery whether or not Mr.
Jackson's driving contravened Ontario criminal law.
It will be recalled that Fuld, J., stated in the case under review:
The object of Ontario's guest statute, it has been said, is to
prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance companies, .

.

. and,

quite obviously, the fraudulent claims intended to be prevented
by the statute are those asserted against Ontario defendants and
their insurance carriers. .

. Whether New York defendants are

imposed upon or their insurers defrauded by a New York plaintiff
is scarcely a valid legislative concern of Ontario simply because
the accident occurred there, any more so than if the accident had
happened in some other jurisdiction."
This view of the law does not seem to have been explicitly taken
by either of the courts which decided the Canadian cases mentioned
above. However, since the results achieved are in conformity with
the views of Fuld, J., it may well be that the point was implicitly
taken by both Canadian courts. It is thought that, to return to the
hypothetical "English" Babcock v. Jackson posited earlier, an English
court might well be prepared to solve it by adopting the same approach
as Fuld, J. Without troubling whether the driver's conduct was or
was not criminal by the law of Ontario, it could easily hold that both
"arms" of the rule were satisfied. The first "arm" would present no
difficulty at all; since the driver was not an Ontario defendant, but
an English one, his driving in Ontario would still be negligent and
"not justifiable," so that the second "arm" would in fact be fulfilled.
Whether an English court would be willing to classify the Ontario
statute in this way, of course, remains to be seen, for it is entitled to
form its own opinion on the matter.2 5

One last possibility is that the case might be presented to the
English court as if it were a purely domestic case, that is to say,
24. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482-83, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1963).
25. See Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150 (P.C. 1892).
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without its ever being treated as a conflicts problem and no mention
being made of the lex loci delicti. Just as this situation has occurred
in the past in the United States,2 so it has occurred in England in
the recent case of Schneider v. Eisovitch" In this case the plaintiff
widow sued in order to recover, inter alia, damages (a) as personal
representative of her late husband, in respect of his death which had
occurred in France owing to the defendant's negligent driving in
France of the car in which the plaintiff and her husband had been
riding as passengers, and (b) in her own right, for nervous shock.
The defendant, as in the present case, conceded liability. The plaintiff
recovered damages under both heads, the case being treated throughout
as if the accident had happened in Brighton, where the couple's
matrimonial home was situated. No one can deny that this result is
as just as that which was reached in Babcock, but English conflict
lawyers are still somewhat mystified as to how it was in fact achieved.
26. See, e.g., LEFLAR, op. cit. supra note 4, at 208, and cases cited therein.
27. Schmeider v. Eisovitch, [1960] 1 All E.R. 169 (Q.B. 1959). Webb, The

Conflict of Laws and the English Fatal Accidents Acts, 24 MoDERN L. Rtv. 467 (1961).
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